Introduction
According to Normativism, linguistic meaning is intrinsically normative (I shall explore what this amounts to below). One, though not the only, reason for
Normativism's importance is that it bears on the prospects of providing an account of meaning in the terms available to the natural sciences. In turn, since linguistic behaviour is inextricably bound up with both non-linguistic behaviour and the psychological attitudes informing it, Normativism might (if true) pose a serious challenge to the project of accommodating creatures such as ourselves within the worldview the natural sciences afford.
In this paper, I shall not focus on such heady themes but rather on the prior issue of whether or not one should accept Normativism. Though certainly in circulation beforehand, it is fair to say that Saul Kripke's (1982) was largely responsible for bringing the thesis to the philosophical forefront. 1 In the years following its publication, Normativism looked close to achieving the status of orthodoxy. At one stage, Crispin Wright felt able to remark assuredly that the view 'strike [s] most people now as a harmless platitude ' (1993: 247) . 2 In recent years, dark slogan, 'meaning is normative', and so to provide sufficient indication of the thesis I shall be defending.
Correctness and truth
One consideration-though not the only-that seems to speak in favour of
Normativism is the platitude-accepted by critics and advocates of Normativism alike-that from the fact that an expression has a particular meaning it follows that certain uses of it are correct or incorrect (cf. Boghossian 1989: 513) . One might capture this idea in the following principle (where 'S' is a subject, 'w' is a word, 'F'
gives its meaning, and 'f'' is that feature in virtue of which w applies):
(C) w means F → ∀x (S correctly applies w to x ↔ x is f ) 9 According to (C), from an expression's meaning there follows a standard that might be used to evaluate and guide linguistic behaviour, for example (given what 'red' means):
(C1) ∀x (S correctly applies 'red' to x ↔ x is red)
It might seem that to accept (C) is to accept Normativism. The antiNormativist denies this on the grounds that, while terms like 'correct' sometimes express normative notions, they do not do so in all contexts. For example, according to Paul Boghossian (yet another critic of Normativism), 10 'it is not clear that, at least as it is being used here, "correct" expresses a normative notion, for it may just mean "true" ' (2005: 207) . Slightly more guardedly, Glüer suggests that 'correct' here is 'some kind of variable, to be replaced by your favored basic semantic concept', such as truth (2001: 60; cf. Glüer and Wikforss 2009a: 36) . Likewise, Hattiangadi states that, as it occurs in (C), '"applies correctly" is a placeholder for various word-to-5 world relations, such as reference or true predication, none of which are obviously normative notions ' (2009: 55; cf. Hattiangadi 2006: 224) .
11
Note first, however, that the anti-Normativist appears to accept that 'correct' does sometimes express a normative notion. Glüer and Wikforss, for example, maintain that '"correct" can be used in normative and non-normative ways ' (2008: 2) .
Likewise, Hattiangadi suggests that 'deontic terms, such as 'correct' […] are not always normative ' (2006: 224, italics mine) . In light of this, one might sympathise with Ralph Wedgwood's complaint 12 that this objection seems to amount to the suggestion that it is simply a chance ambiguity that the word 'correct' is used both in a normative sense and in a sense where it just means [true] (just as it is a chance ambiguity that 'bank' can mean both money bank and river bank) and that suggestion is surely implausible, to say the least. Wedgwood does not back up his charge of implausibility but one might find support for it by reflecting on the following argument:
(1) Sophie behaved correctly when she returned the wallet she found to its owner.
(2) Sophie correctly applied 'red' to the red object.
(3) So, Sophie behaved correctly twice.
One would surely not want to convict this seemingly innocuous inference of fallaciously equivocating. But, if one grants that as it occurs in (1) 'correct' expresses a normative notion, 13 and if one agrees with the anti-Normativist that as it occurs in (2) it does not so, one would have to deliver such a verdict.
Admittedly, this point is not decisive but it does place a burden on the antiNormativist to provide reason to think that 'correct' behaves in the way that she suggests, when appearances suggest otherwise, or to present an uncontroversial 6 example of a context in which 'correct' expresses a non-normative notion. Fortunately, the anti-Normativists offer such examples, which I shall discuss below. Before doing so, it is worth examining further considerations, which Gideon Rosen offers, that count against the anti-Normativist's claim that '"correct" in this context is just another word for "true" ' (2001: 619 (2) with:
(2*) Sophie truly applied 'red' to the red object.
This supports the suggestion that (2) and (2*) differ in what they express, even though, whenever (2) is true, (2*) is true.
The upshot of this is that, even if one agrees with the anti-Normativist that truth is a non-normative notion and that claims concerning correctness can be straightforwardly transformed into claims concerning truth, this does nothing to show that claims concerning correctness are non-normative.
What the discussion in this section shows, I think, is that the considerations, which the anti-Normativist introduces, pertaining to the substitutability of 'correctly'
with 'truly' as it occurs in (C1) and similar contexts, is just a red-herring. What the anti-Normativist really needs to establish is not simply that from (C1) and the like one can derive a non-normative statement about, say, the conditions under which an expression truly applies-the Normativist has no reason to deny this 15 It is true that, in order to meet the standard, and so for her going on the ride to satisfy the conditions of correctness, certain descriptions must be true of a child, namely that she is sufficiently tall. That is, certain 'straightforwardly non-normative, natural facts' must hold, and can be derived from the statement that she satisfies the relevant norm.
Nevertheless, given that the standard is in force, that the child does as a matter of fact meet it (or fails to) certainly has implications for whether or not she may (or should not) go on the ride. If she were to do so incorrectly, with the norm in place, sanctions or criticism of one form or another would be appropriate. Hence, […] to say that there are correctness-conditions for a child's going on a ride is to say that going on that ride is a normative matter.
Likewise, if a statement about the meaning of an expression does indeed imply that there are conditions for its correct application […] then it equally has implications for whether it may or should be used in certain ways. (2007: 136) In reply to these remarks, Hattiangadi invites us to consider what kind of standard might be operative at the fairground. Compare:
(S1) S is permitted (to ride) ↔ S is over 1 meter tall (S2) Ride X is safe for S ↔ S is over 1 meter tall In light of this, my past remarks about Hattiangadi's example seem too hasty; they overlook the possibility that the relevant standard might take the form of (S2).
Evidently, (S2) does not as such have prescriptive import. 'Safe' does not express an intrinsically normative notion-that something is safe does not have immediate implications for whether or not it should or may be done. 16 One can, however, use this to turn the tables on the anti-Normativist. Recall, as stressed above, that the fairground case is supposed to provide a clear example of a standard by which one can judge that a certain act is correct and which, on its own, has no implications for what a subject should, may or has reason to do (or not to do) Hattiangadi 2006: 224) . Only as such could it show that (C1) and the like, despite the occurrence of 'correctly', might be non-normative. However, if the fairground standard is along the lines of (S2), it no longer appears possible, without further ado, to derive from it, and the statement that Vikram is over 1 meter tall, the statement that his going on the ride would be correct (as opposed to the statement that Vikram's going on the ride would be safe). Once the content of the standard is made explicit in this way, the inference ceases to seem legitimate. Hattiangadi has, therefore, failed to provide an uncontroversial example of a standard that is non-normative and by reference to which an act can be judged correct. Hattiangadi has thereby failed to cast doubt on the normative status of (C1). Indeed, one might venture, the fact that one is unable to arrive at judgements of correctness by appeal to the fairground standard purged of normative vocabulary provides support for the view that correctness is a normative affair (and so for the view that the platitudinous status of (C) speaks in favour of Normativism). Note, however, that the present dispute concerns whether normative consequences flow from a true statement of correctness-conditions. All participants to the debate agree that a principle such as (C1) is true, indeed that it is trivially true. 18 Miller appears to hold that (S3) could be true-presumably if the standard were enforced at a fairground-and yet possess no normative implications. But it would surely be reasonable to deny that, in the envisaged situation, (S3) would or could be true. 19 What a person eats for breakfast on an arbitrary day of the week during an arbitrary period of time has nothing to do with the rights and wrongs, the correctness or otherwise, of going on fairground rides. Indeed, the considerations that speak against the idea that one has reason or ought to subscribe to (S3) are the very same considerations that speak against its being true.
Importantly, and while I grant that my erstwhile remarks above might suggest otherwise, it is no part of Normativism that anything purporting to be a norm really is one, that any sentence containing a normative term expresses a truth. So, should a fairground proprietor formulate (S3), and even enforce it, it does not follow that (S3) is true. This, however, would be disingenuous since, as mentioned, the truth of (C1) is not at issue. All agree that (C) is the merest platitude, and for good reason. As 
Prescribing and proscribing
In the preceding sections, I defended the claim that 'correctly' expresses a normative notion as it occurs in (C). So, insofar as (C) is trivially true, Normativism is too. This is an appropriate stage, then, at which to turn to assess the very idea-whatever motivates it-that facts about meaning possess prescriptive import.
Consider, as a first attempt to capture Normativism (and thereby the normative import of (C)):
(P) w means F → ∀x (S ought to (apply w to x) ↔ x is f) 20 Hattiangadi and I agree that (P) is false:
Given what it means, one is not obliged to employ an expression such as 'dog' to all dogs. Indeed, doing so is not even possible and, in so far as ought implies can, there can be no such requirement. (Whiting 2007: 137; cf. Hattiangadi 2009: 58) 21 In its place, I previously advanced the following, weaker principle:
Norms of the kind that according to (P*) are in force, I claimed, 'are action-guiding' perhaps, if it is not the case that x is f, what follows is that it is not the case that you ought to apply w to x. That is, if it is not the case that x is f it follows that you lack an obligation to apply w to x, not that you are obligated not to apply w to x. (2009: 58) For these reasons, one should reject (P*) and so (P). But, for the Normativist, all is not lost. Consider instead the following:
(P') w means F → ∀x (S ought not to (apply w to x) ↔ x is not f) (P') is equivalent to:
Formulating Normativism in this manner is not simply an ad hoc attempt to avoid the serious objections that bedevil (P), mentioned above. Not only, as I hope to show, is the principle so-formulated defensible but, insofar as Normativists widely view the triviality of (C) as speaking in favour of the thesis they advance, (P') seems a more faithful rendering of Normativism. This is because what is correct is more
closely related to what one may do than it is to what one ought to be do.
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To say, for example, that moving a rook horizontally is correct is, surely, not to say that one should move it horizontally-perhaps one should move it vertically or not at all-although it is certainly to imply that one is allowed to do so. Likewise, to say that to play certain notes in a particular way is to perform Beethoven's Moonlight Sonata correctly is, surely, not to say that one ought to play it in that way-perhaps there are indefinitely many suitable renderings of the piece-but it is to suggest that it is alright to do so. Again, suppose that in the course of constructing a proof, one correctly derives 'P v Q' from the assumption 'P'. One might well be prepared to judge that doing so is acceptable-the move accords with the rules of inference-but reluctant to judge that one ought to do so-there might be other, equally good ways of reaching the desired conclusion. Finally, to hammer the point home, consider political correctness. While the claim that a certain epithet is politically incorrect certainly implies that you should not use it, the claim that another is politically correct surely does not imply that you should employ it but, at most, that it is okay to do so.
Judgements of political correctness and incorrectness serve principally to license and prohibit certain forms of behaviour, rather than mandate them.
Importantly, I am not claiming that what is correct is equivalent to what may
be done; there are many things that one may do-cross one's legs when sitting, for example-that one would not ordinarily deem correct. Moreover, I am not claiming that in saying that such-and-such is correct one is saying no more than that it may be done. For all that I claim here, describing an act as correct might convey much more besides. The suggestion is only, first, that the statement that an act is correct implies without further ado that one may perform it (but not that one ought to do so) and, second, that the statement that an act is incorrect implies without further do that one ought not to perform it (and not merely that it is not the case that one ought to do so).
Thus, in retrospect, one might take the anti-Normativist's successful objections to (P)
as precisely showing that it fails as an attempt to capture the normative import of (C), rather than as showing that (C) has no such import whatsoever.
In light of this, it seems that (P') is motivated quite independently of the problems facing (P) and the like. Either (C) implies (P') or, if one wishes not to take a stand on the disputed normative status of (C), (P') captures better than (P) what the Normativist has in mind. Either way, it is the formulation to focus on.
Whatever thoughts might lead someone to advance (P'), Hattiangadi rejects it on the grounds that it is highly counterintuitive. It implies that whenever you express a false propositionwhether this is because you want to lie, speak with irony, make a joke, or simply By way of response, note in the first instance that the view sketched above, and embodied in (P'), to which the anti-Normativist objects, can be no worse off in light of the considerations adduced than one that the anti-Normativist is, by her own admission, committed to. Recall that the anti-Normativist accepts (C). But, if one grants the anti-Normativist's complaint concerning (P'), parity of reasoning should surely lead to the conclusion that (C) is equally 'highly counterintuitive'. Taken at face value, (C) seems to imply that when one misapplies an expression to save a person's life, for example, one is doing something incorrect, when misapplying the expression is (intuitively) precisely the correct course of action (this does not turn on whether or not 'correct' here is understood to express a normative notion). Thus, if the anti-Normativists complaints are persuasive with respect to (P'), they should equally lead to the rejection of (C). For good reason, this is not something that would appeal to the anti-Normativist. Recall Hattiangadi's apposite remark, quoted above, on what distinguishes the meaningful use of language from mere noise.
Fortunately, rejecting the seemingly inviolable (C) is not forced upon us.
Consider first (P'). Contra the anti-Normativist, (P') is not counterintuitive so long as the 'semantic obligation', or rather the statement concerning what one ought to do, is understood as prima facie (cf. Whiting, 2007: 138-9 semantically correct but all-things-considered incorrect. Since the anti-Normativist will have to tell some such story with respect to (C), and since some such story seems readily available and innocent enough, there appears to be no principled reason not to provide a similar account with respect to (P'). Hence, I conclude, the antiNormativist's complaint that (P') is 'highly counterintuitive' is unjustified.
Overriding desires
Anti-Normativists are typically not impressed with the appeal to prima facie 'ought's.
According to the anti-Normativist's intuitions, Glüer and Wikforss report, 'the alleged semantic obligations can be overridden by mere desires, such as the desire to lie or mislead. That is not how prima facie obligations behave, however; genuine prima facie obligations can only be overridden by other (prima facie) obligations ' (2008: 4) .
The positive claim above regarding what can override a prima facie 'ought'-namely, only another prima facie 'ought'-is contentious, to say the least.
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Supposing that a subject ought prima facie to Φ; it may well be that additional considerations mean that it is not the case that all-things-considered she ought to Φ, where those considerations do not themselves make it the case that the subject ought prima facie not to Φ , or that she ought prima facie to Ψ instead (say, in cases where
Φing would be very costly to the subject) (see Darwall 1987: esp. 78ff ). Equally contentious is the anti-Normativist's negative claim above regarding what cannot override a prima facie 'ought'-namely, desire. Supposing that a subject prima ought to Φ, it is at least arguable that, in a suitable context, the fact that she has a desire not to Φ, or to Ψ instead, means that it is not the case that she ought to Φ (say, in cases where her dignity or integrity are at stake) (see Darwall 2003) .
Of course, I have offered nothing in support of the remarks in the previous paragraph but for present purposes I do not need to take a stand with respect to the issues they concern. The important point is only that, even if the anti-Normativist's intuitions reported above are reliable with respect to what can and cannot override 'alleged semantic obligations', this may not be enough to show that those 'obligations' are not 'genuine'.
That said, the anti-Normativist does not really need to make the positive claim and presumably only needs to make a watered-down version of the negative claim.
Her case requires no more than that, whatever else might override a genuine prima facie 'ought', it cannot be overridden by the mere fact of desire alone (as opposed to the fact of desire plus considerations of integrity, etc). Since, the anti-Normativist's case continues, intuitions suggest that mere desire alone can override or otherwise defeat an 'alleged semantic obligation', (P') must be false, even where the 'ought' it contains is read as prima facie.
In support of the view that what an expression means implies that one ought prima facie to employ it in a certain way-and against the suggestion that this implication is at best conditional upon the presence or absence of mere desires on the part of the subject-I previously wrote:
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That I ought not to go outside if it is raining is contingent upon my desire to stay dry.
If that desire changes, I will not have done anything incorrect or failed to do as I should by going outside in the rain. Were I to do so, it would be unwarranted and make little sense to insist that, desire notwithstanding, my act was wrong.
In contrast, given what 'rich' means, that I ought not to apply the term to a person if she is not rich does not seem contingent upon (say) my desire to speak 20 truthfully. If that desire changes, and I apply the term to a poor person, it remains the case that I am applying it as it should not be applied, but rather incorrectly. Here it seems one is properly entitled, it makes full sense to judge that, desire notwithstanding, I am using the expression wrongly. (2007: 139) Hattiangadi accepts the letter of this passage but rejects its spirit, reasserting the nowfamiliar suggestion that terms like 'incorrectly' need not express normative notions.
To 'assume' that they do as they occur in the above is 'question-begging ' (2009: 60) . Glüer and Wikforss (2008: §2) and Miller (Forthcoming b: §4) concur.
But this reply takes for granted that the anti-Normativist succeeded in undermining the claim that 'correct' and its kin express normative notions. I argued above that they have not, in which case the charge of question-begging cannot get a grip.
Although one could leave matters there, it is worth pointing out that the same line of thought as that expressed in the above passage can be easily reformulated using terms that the anti-Normativist recognises as genuinely prescriptive:
Given what 'rich' means, that I ought not to apply the term to a person if she is not rich does not seem contingent upon (say) my desire to speak truthfully. If that desire changes, and I apply the term to a poor person, it remains the case that I am not applying it as I may apply it, but rather as I may not. Here it seems one is properly entitled, it makes full sense to judge that, desire notwithstanding, I am using the expression as I ought not (or have reason not to).
To this, the anti-Normativist would presumably object that the passage simply 'assumes' rather than shows that meaning is categorically normative. Reformulating the remarks has only, she might complain, served to make the question-begging more flagrant.
21
With regards to both the original passage and its successor, however, the charge of question-begging is unfair. What the remarks highlight is that, when a term is misapplied, it is not obviously senseless or manifestly unwarranted (absenting overriding considerations) to criticise the speaker for applying the expression as she
should not have done, or as she had reason not to, and thereby to evaluate her linguistic behaviour negatively.
In contrast, in the uncontroversial case of the relinquished instrumental norm, it is obviously senseless and manifestly unwarranted to criticise the subject for doing what she should not have done, or had reason not to do, and thereby to evaluate her rain-related behaviour negatively. So, appearances strongly suggest that semantic norms are not contingent upon a subject's desires, and so that what an expression means has implications for what one ought prima facie to do. As far as I can see, the anti-Normativists have yet to address this issue.
Needless to say, it could turn out that appearances in this instance are deceptive, that our habits of criticism are misguided, that it would be wrong to criticise a person misapplying an expression (simply because she desires to) for doing what she should, may or has reason to not do. The present point is only that this needs to be shown. There are observations that speak in favour of the claim that semantic norms hold independent of a subject's desires and the anti-Normativist has so far adduced none to the contrary. Until she does so, Normativism stands.
The suggestion that the ought-statement captured by (P') should be understood as prima facie was offered as the most plausible construal of Normativism. So far, by way of objection, the anti-Normativists have only reported that 'according to their intuitions' (Glüer and Wikforss 2008: 4) principled reason for advancing it. Specifically, the Normativist can point to the fact that (C) is a platitude, as all agree, and since (C) implies (P'), as argued above, (P') is also a platitude. Thus, even if one agrees with the anti-Normativist that 'intuitionmongering' (Glüer and Wikforss 2008: 5; cf. Glüer and Wikforss 2009b : §2.1.1) is unlikely to contribute to resolving the issue of whether semantic norms can be overridden by desires alone, the status of (C) establishes a presumption in favour of Normativism.
The bearable lightness of meaning
As stressed above, the anti-Normativist owes a principled objection to the disputed thesis, understood as committed to (P'). She might try to develop one on the grounds that it is extremely, and to that degree implausibly, demanding. it unimportant and, in doing so, makes it all the more palatable.
Conclusion
In this paper, I sought to defend the claim that a certain platitude-namely, that meaningful expressions possess conditions of correct use-supports the thesis that meaning is normative. Next, I turned to evaluate the very idea that what an expression means has prescriptive or proscriptive import with respect to how one employs it and suggested that, so long as the relevant prescription or proscription is understood as prima facie and as suitably light, the idea is defensible. So, both one of the considerations in support of Normativism, and the thesis itself are secure. We should not, then, feel fraught about the thought that meaning is fraught with ought.
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The anti-Normativists are nonetheless to be congratulated for encouraging lackadaisical Normativists to clarify the thesis they advance. For too long, Normativism has been vaguely gestured at while little attempt has been made to sharpen our understanding of it. In response to anti-Normativist criticisms, we are moving towards an adequate formulation of Normativism and the principles underlying it. Those criticisms, however, are serving ultimately to strengthen, rather than undermine, the important claim that meaning is normative.
behind the slogan 'meaning is normative' are very thorny issues that I cannot enter into here. Suffice it to say, the formulation I offer here is faithful to the terms of the present debate surrounding that slogan.
9 This differs from the formulation in (Whiting 2007) , namely:
(C) w means F → ∀x (w applies correctly to x ↔ x is f ) This is inadequate since 'there is no agent mentioned in (C)' (Hattiangadi 2009: 55) .
Previously ( 10 At one time, Boghossian (1989) was one of the foremost advocates of Normativism.
11 One might resist this by distinguishing (semantically) correct use and correct (true) application (cf. n9). However, I suspect the anti-Normativist would simply reformulate the point so as to apply to talk of correct use, understood accordingly, and so I shall not pursue this strategy.
Alternatively, if one holds that truth is itself a normative notion, as several philosophers do, then the claim that 'correctly' as it occurs in (C) is just a placeholder for 'truly' lends no support whatsoever to anti-Normativism. I shall not pursue this line either, since I am not sympathetic to the pertinent view about truth. For a recent discussion of this issue, see Lynch 2004. 12 Wedgwood is responding to claims concerning the alleged normativity of belief, not of meaning.
13 Needless to say, the exact example used is unimportant to the point being made. (1) may be replaced with any uncontroversial example of a sentence in which 'correct' expresses a normative notion. plausible) than it really is. Accordingly, I shall steer clear of using the term 'obligation' myself in connection with Normativism. 22 The remarks in next two paragraphs follow draw upon (Whiting Forthcoming) . 23 Glüer and Wikforss direct this complaint against (P*), but presumably they would take it to apply equally to (P'). 24 This explains why it can make sense to say, 'You ought to use the term incorrectly'
(cp. Hattiangadi 2009: 60; Rosen 2001: 620-1) . 25 For reasons why I stick to 'ought'-talk rather than 'obligation'-talk in this context, see n21. Darwall's discussion is primarily framed in terms of obligations, but it would be straightforward enough to reformulation it in the terms I prefer.
26 I have adapted these remarks to accommodate (P*)'s rejection. Hattiangadi also has reservations about 'should not be', since it is not agent-implicating (2009: 62). I shall take this on board in the reformulation of the passage below.
27 One might at this point challenge the Normativist to explain how what an expression means could, alone, have implications for how a subject should, may or has reason to employ it. This important issue has received surprisingly little attention; indeed, it is almost entirely ignored (although see Millar 2004) . Normativism would, surely, be bolstered if a plausible explanation for what it claims to be the case were on offer, and the thesis might be hard to swallow in the absence of such an account.
While I agree that accounting for the normativity of meaning is a pressing task, doing so is beyond the scope of this paper.
